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Abstract:   
We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms’ organizational 
structure, and consumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model 
featuring source-based profit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become 
multinationals, i.e., they serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate; or 
they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the foreign market by contracting with an 
independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, where tax authorities are 
either unable to audit firms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, the use of the 
OECD’s Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts firms’ 
output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm’s length 
transactions between exporters and distributors, which serve as benchmarks, are not 
efficient. We show that implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in 
the low tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high tax country. 
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1 Introduction
Multinationals have strong incentives to minimize their tax liability by using transfer prices to
manipulate corporate profits. High transfer prices charged for goods sold to affiliates operating in
high tax countries serve as a tool that allows those firms to repatriate profits to low tax countries,
thereby reducing their overall tax burden. When firms face no restrictions, transfer prices may
become pure tax-evasion devices with no economic meaning. Obvious examples include firms which
“sold toothbrushes between subsidiaries for $5,655 each”, or others which were “buying plastic
buckets for $973 each and tweezers for $4,896.”1 Tax authorities thus have a strong incentive to
recover tax revenue by auditing multinationals, by restricting their freedom to set transfer prices,
by contesting their tax declarations, and by negotiating possible settlements.
While transfer pricing certainly is often far from economic reality and puts strain on the cor-
porate profits tax base, not all firms ‘sell buckets for a thousand bucks’. Put differently, not all
transfer prices are pure tax-evasion devices. Hence, when tax authorities do interfer with firms’
transfer pricing decisions they are likely to create inefficiencies that distort market prices and firms’
organizational choices, and which increase the cost of running global corporations. Furthermore,
“a system that forces on multinational firms similar prices to those faced by unrelated firms misses
the point of multinationals: to cut costs by locating their activities more efficiently around the
world.”2 Business men complain that “transfer pricing [. . .] forces us to spend a lot of time doing
things that are pointless from a business point of view. We have to waste time trying to price un-
finished goods being ‘sold’ from one plant to another. [. . .] Businesses want to organise as if there
were a single global or regional product market. Instead, tax is determining how they organise
themselves. [. . .] The tax system promotes parochial thinking.”3
To cope with these conflicting problems, the OECD has suggested a set of guidelines to alleviate
market distortions while helping tax authorities and multinationals to reach mutually satisfactory
agreements (OECD, 2001). The economic efficiency of those guidelines is generally based on
the notion of arm’s length price, which is “the price two unrelated parties would reach through
bargaining in a competitive market” (Eden, 1998, p.602). As multinationals are known to operate
in imperfectly competitive markets, the OECD guidelines are likely to reflect market distortions
arising even between unrelated parties.
This paper studies the market distortions implied by the two mostly frequently used transfer
pricing rules in the OECD guidelines, namely, the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (henceforth,
CUP) and the Cost Plus (henceforth, CP) rules (see Ernst & Young, 2002). To do so, we develop
1The Economist, “A taxing battle”, 1/31/2004, Vol. 370 Issue 8360, p.71–72; Op cit., “Discord over harmony”,
11/12/2005, Vol. 377 Issue 8452, p. 82–82
2The Economist, “Taxing questions”, 5/22/93, Vol. 327 Issue 7812, p.73.
3The Economist, “Gimme shelter”, 01/29/2000, Vol. 354 Issue 8155, Special section p. 15–17.
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a two-country trade model a` la Krugman (1980) with corporate tax differentials and costly trade
across countries. Firms have a single production plant and sell differentiated products in their
domestic and their foreign markets. They can decide to become multinationals, by owning a
foreign affiliate which markets and distributes the product in the foreign market; or they can
become exporters by delegating these tasks to a foreign independent distributor. Exporters and
independent distributors enter into arm’s length relationships that generate inefficiencies because
independent distributors have control over their tasks. Such inefficiencies do not arise within
multinationals that keep full management control (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Once, firms have
chosen their structures, they set their market prices, decide on how to split their transport costs
among business units and decide on their transfer prices between units.
We show that transfer prices under OECD rules reflect the inefficiencies of arm’s length re-
lationships between exporters and independent distributors. In particular, when tax authorities
apply the CUP rule, they constrain multinationals to set their transfer prices at the same lev-
els than those prevailing in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Yet, comparable uncontrolled
transactions need not, in general, be efficient. Transfer prices are thus biased upwards and affect
positively the profits of multinationals producing in the low tax country and negatively those of
multinationals producing in the high tax country. Concerning the pricing distortions, our key
results may be summarized as follows. First, multinationals are indifferent as to the exact im-
putation of transport costs between their affiliates. Second, the CUP rule is equivalent to the
CP rule in which transfer prices are set to the manufacturing cost reported by the affiliates plus
an ‘appropriate’ margin in the industry. This result allows us to simplify the analysis of market
distortions by covering the CUP and CP rules in the same discussion. Third, we show how the
transfer pricing rules distort prices and outputs. On the one hand, multinationals producing in
the high tax country are enticed to set too high sales prices and to manufacture too little of the
goods they ship to the low tax country. This is because transfer prices are biased upward and
force multinationals to repatriate profits against their will. Multinationals therefore inflate prices
in the low tax country to increase their tax base there. On the other hand, multinationals produc-
ing in the low tax country set too high sales prices and manufacture too little of the goods they
ship to the high tax country. The upward biased transfer price allows those firms to repatriate
profits to the low tax country. Hence, they are enticed to inflate their shipments to the foreign
affiliates. To sum up, we show that tax discrepancies give rise to price and output distortions
under the OECD transfer pricing rules, whereas they do not when tax authorities acquire perfect
information (perfect audit) or no information at all (no audit).
Turning to distortions in firms’ organizational choices, our key results may be summarized
as follows. First, the incentives to choose a multinational structure are always larger for the
firms producing in the high tax country. This is because transfer prices allow multinationals to
shift profits. One the one hand, the multinationals producing in the high tax country are able to
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reduce their domestic tax base on their foreign sales, whereas their fellow-country exporters are not
able to do so with their foreign independent distributors. On the other hand, the multinationals
producing in the low tax country are obliged to report their foreign profits to the foreign tax
authorities. They only avoid the inefficiency in the arm’s length relationship with distributors in
the exporter structure. Their incentives to ‘go multinational’ are therefore weaker. Second, we
show that firms producing in the low tax country have quite surprisingly stronger incentives to go
multinational when tax authorities apply the OECD rules than when they do not audit the firms
at all.
Finally, we also discuss the impacts of transfer pricing rules on consumers’ utility. Transfer
pricing rules can have intensive (via the product prices) and extensive (via firms’ structure) margin
effects on consumers and those effects may conflict. We show that the intensive margin effects favor
consumers in the high tax country because multinationals shipping to this country reduce their
sales prices as compared to exporters. By contrast, extensive margin effects do not favor those
consumers because foreign firms more often prefer to serve them through independent distributors
who charge higher prices. Interestingly, the intensive margin effect dominates in the case of the
OECD rules, so that consumers’ utility is higher in the high tax country than it is in the low tax
one. Hence, high tax countries may have lower consumer prices given firms organizational choices.
Related literature. Since the initial contributions by Copithorne (1971) and Horst (1973), em-
pirical and theoretical research on transfer pricing has expanded rapidly. As summarized by Grezik
(2001), empirical evidence suggests that transfer pricing behavior exists but is not uniform across
industries. More recently, studies by Clausing (2003) and by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) con-
firm that transfer prices are significantly correlated with the tax rates faced by affiliates’ and that
they strongly hamper governments’ effectiveness to raise revenue using corporate taxes. Swenson
(2002) and Bernard et al. (2008) also report recent evidence on how multinationals manipulate
their affiliates’ sales prices. Turning to theory, most existing contributions focus on a single firm
and assume fully efficient arm’s lenght relationships. In addition, comparable uncontrolled trans-
actions and ‘appropriate’ margins are mostly taken as exogenous or as being unrelated to the
industry conditions that tax authorities are recommended to use. For instance, Itagaki (1979)
considers a simple exogenous transfer price; Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) and Elitzur and Mintz
(1996) assume an exogenous ’appropriate’ mark-up under the CP rule; and Samuelson (1982) takes
the multinational’s (controlled!) mill price as the comparable uncontrolled price to assess foreign
transactions.
The present paper departs from this literature in several ways. First, it discusses transfer pricing
issues within an established intra-industry trade model (Krugman, 1980) that has been extensively
used to explain the behavior of multinationals (Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and Venables,
2004). Second, it analyzes the implications of imperfect arm’s length relationships on transfer
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pricing, whereas most of the literature assumes that arm’s length relationships are efficient. Third,
it considers the issue of the imputation of trade costs between multinationals’ affiliates. While many
studies discuss the impact of trade costs and tariffs on transfer prices, none has to the best of our
knowledge investigated how affiliates declare those costs across countries. Finally, whereas the
existing literature assumes the existence of uncontrolled firms for the aim of assessing comparable
transactions, this paper discusses the emergence of such firms as the independent distributors that
are choosen by exporters. Last, note that this paper also weakly relates to the discussions of
inefficiencies in approportionment tax base rules (Nielsen et al., 2003), of government competition
in the design of transfer pricing rules (Mansori and Weichenrieder, 1999; Raimondos-Møller and
Sharf, 2002; Peralta et al., 2006), and on transfer pricing and tax competition (Elitzur and Mintz,
1996).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. We
study the exporter price and the trade cost imputation decisions in Section 3, and the multinational
prices, trade cost imputation and transfer pricing decisions in Section 4. We do this for each possible
transfer pricing rule. In Section 5, we then discuss the choice of production structure, whereas we
analyze the implications of transfer pricing rules on consumers’ utility in Section 6. We conclude
in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy with two countries, labeled i = 1, 2. Variables associated with each country
will be subscripted accordingly. Each country hosts the same mass L of consumers–workers, which
have identical Cobb-Douglas CES preferences given by:
Ui = z
1−µ
(∫
Ωi
qii(v)
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
Ωj
qji(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) µσ
σ−1
j 6= i, (1)
where qji(v) denotes the consumption of variety v in country i when it is produced in country j;
where Ωi denotes the set of varieties produced in country i, with mass ni; and where z is a
homogenous good. The parameters σ > 1 and 0 < µ < 1 denote the elasticity of substitution
between the varieties of the differentiated good and consumers’ expenditure share for that good,
respectively. In what follows, we normalize the total mass of varieties produced in each country to
one (ni ≡ 1, for i = 1, 2).
Consumers maximize utility (1) subject to their budget constraint∫
Ωi
pii(v)qii(v)dv +
∫
Ωj
pji(v)qji(v)dv + p
z
i z = Ii, j 6= i, (2)
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where pji(v) denotes the price of variety v produced in country j and sold in country i; and where
pzi is the price of the homogenous good. Given identical and homothetic preferences, Ii stands for
the aggregate income in country i. Maximizing (1) subject to (2), we readily obtain the following
aggregate demands:
qii(v) =
pii(v)
−σ
P
1−σ
i
µIi and qji(v) =
pji(v)
−σ
P
1−σ
i
µIi (3)
where
P
1−σ
i ≡
∫
Ωi
pii(v)
1−σdv +
∫
Ωj
pji(v)
1−σdv, j 6= i (4)
stands for the CES price index in country i.
Using expressions (1) and (3), as well as the demand for the homogenous good z = (1−µ)Ii/p
z
i
finally yields the representative consumer’s indirect utility as follows
Vi =
µµ(1− µ)1−µ
P
µ
i (p
z
i )
1−µ
Ii (5)
2.2 Technology, transport costs and taxes
We assume that labor is the only factor of production and that it is perfectly mobile across sectors.
All workers in the country have the same unit productivity and, therefore, earn the same wage.
In the homogenous good sector, firms produce with a constant returns to scale technology using
labor only, and firms trade their outputs at no cost. This good is produced in both countries at
equilibrium provided L is large enough which we assume from now on. Trade of the homogenous
good then implies that pzi = p = w
z
i = 1 for i = 1, 2, where the last equality reflects our choice of
this good as the nume´raire.
In the differentiated industry, each firm produces and sells one firm-specific variety v, which
allows us to also use v as a firm index. Each firm incurs three types of costs. First, each firm has
the same unit input requirement, which we normalize to one without loss of generality. Second, it
incurs an ‘iceberg’ (ad-valorem) transport cost τ > 1 for shipping the good from the country of
production to the foreign market: for one unit of any variety to arrive at its destination, the firm
has to ship τ units of it. This assumption has become a staple element in international economics
since Krugman (1980). Last, each firm incurs a cost for distributing its product in each local
market. This cost depends on the variety v and is proportional to the multinational’s sales in each
local market. More formally, variety v is associated with a variety-specific marketing efficiency
parameter ϕi(v) ∈ [0, 1] such that a share 1− ϕi(v) of each unit of profit made in a market is lost
in the marketing process. Such costs subsume the cost heterogeneity in advertising, marketing,
learning, expertise, retail and distribution, which generally differ across varieties.
Firms have a single production plant and two options for accessing the export market:4
4Note that we do not discuss the ‘proximity-concentration’ trade-off, highlighted in the international trade
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1. they can sell their good to a foreign independent distributor who bears the marketing cost
associated with the variety sold. We refer to this case as the exporter structure;
2. they can transfer their good to a fully owned and controlled foreign affiliate, who bears the
variety’s marketing cost. We refer to this case as the multinational structure.
Our setup encapsulates the arm’s length principle that is at the core of the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines. The independent distributor in the exporter structure is able to sell the traded good
with an additional mark-up. The exporting firm must thus balance the inefficiency of independent
distribution (which stems from double marginalization) with its variety-specific marketing cost
that it would incur if it chooses a multinational structure.
In what follows, we put the superscript x on variables pertaining to exporters, the superscript d
on variables pertaining to distributors, while we put no superscript on those pertaining to multina-
tionals. Let rxi and ri stand for the transfer prices of exporters and of multinationals, respectively.
We refer to the former as the external transfer price (between exporters and distributors) and to
the latter as the internal transfer price (within multinationals). We denote by xi and mi the mass
of exporters and of multinationals established in country i. By assumption, mi+xi = 1 for i = 1, 2,
so that the total mass of producers satisfies m1 + x1 +m2 + x2 = 2.
By contrast to the homogenous good sector, shipping the differentiated good across countries
is costly. We naturally assume that the same transportation costs are incurred independently of
whether the firm chooses an exporter or a multinational structure. Yet, in both cases the question
arises as to how firms will split these transport costs among exporters and distributors, or among
affiliates. Note that this question is important in the presence of tax differences across countries
as the multinational may alleviate its tax burden by imputing a larger share of transport costs to
the affiliate located in the high tax country. Put differently, the split of the transport bill may
serve as a transfer-pricing instrument. In what follows, we denote by τii ≥ 1 the transport costs
borne by the upstream unit (either multinational or exporter) producing the good in country i,
and by τij ≥ 1 the transport costs borne by the downstream unit (either affiliate or independent
distributor) marketing the good in country j 6= i where it is consumed.5 By definition of iceberg
transport costs we have τiiτij = τ as the full costs must be jointly borne by the upstream and
downstream units.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
literature, where firms incur additional fixed costs for doing FDI in order to save on variable transport costs. This
trade-off has been extensively documented elsewhere in the literature (see, e.g., Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti
and Venables, 2004).
5We rule out the case where either τii < 1 or τij < 1 as this would amount to cross-subsidization by charging
negative transport costs to one unit of the firm.
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Figure 1 summarizes how the value of production changes as exported goods move from the domes-
tic production unit to the foreign unit, and then to the market. Note that the full transfer price
riτij represents the total cost borne by the foreign unit (distributor or affiliate) in this distribution
chain.
Turning to taxes, all differentiated firms pay source-based corporate profits taxes at a rate ti
on profits made in country i.6 Let θi ≡ 1 − ti denote the ‘after-tax rate of profit’ in country i,
i.e., a gross profit of one dollar yields an after-tax profit of θi dollars that can be distributed to
shareholders. In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that country 1 is the high-
tax country. Formally, θ1 < θ2 (i.e., t1 > t2). Profits are assumed to be distributed to absentee
shareholders. Also, for simplicity, tax revenues are not directly redistributed to consumers. When
taken together, the foregoing assumptions imply that the two countries have the same aggregate
income Ii = wiL = L for i = 1, 2.
3 Exporter structure
We begin by characterizing the choice of exporting firms. By assumption, the exporting firm does
not have nexus in the foreign market and must hence rely on an independent distributor who
sells its product there and who bears the marketing cost. Because there is no possibility to write
complete contracts between the two firms, this arm’s length relationship is not efficient (Grossman
and Hart, 1986). This is because the independent distributor has the right to manage his firm and
negotiates the price at which he buys the goods from the exporter.
For the sake of clarity let us drop the reference to the variety v and focus on exporters located
in country i, the subsequent results applying to any variety and any country. The timing is as
follows: first, the exporter and the independent distributor located in the other country negotiate
an external transfer price rxi for the good and decide how to impute transport costs among the
exporter and the distributor, τxii and τ
d
ij , with τ
x
iiτ
d
ij = τ ; then, the independent distributor sets
a price pxij and supplies the good to his local market, whereas the exporter sets the price p
x
ii at
which she supplies her local market. The relationship between the exporter and the distributor is
specific and costly to break. As a result, both firms cannot earn anything outside their established
relationship. 7 The exporter is fully taxed in her country of establishment. Her after-tax profit is
6Keen (1993) argues that the effective taxation of multinationals is source based, even though tax codes may
stipulate otherwise. This is referred to as the ‘separate entity approach’, i.e., tax authorities treat multinationals’
affiliates as separate firms when determining tax liability (OECD, 2001).
7Independent distributors make irreversible investments in advertising, marketing, and distribution channels.
Exporters sink similar investments on behalf of their distributors. The specific relationship is also often written
down in, and enforced by, exclusivity contracts that stipulate large penalties in the case of a unilateral separation.
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thus given by Πxi ≡ pi
x
ii + pi
x
ij, where
pixii ≡ θi (p
x
ii − 1) q
x
iiϕi and pi
x
ij ≡ θi (r
x
i − τii) τijq
x
ij
denote the after-tax profits she makes from sales in her domestic and export markets, respectively;
and where qxij ≡ qij(p
x
ij) for i, j = 1, 2. In this expression, the exporter sells to her distributor
at the external transfer price rxi . It bears the marketing cost ϕi (associated with the variety v
produced in country i) at home but not abroad. Exporters and distributors are negligible to the
market and, therefore, take the price indices Pi and Pj as given when setting their optimal prices.
In the second stage, the exporter sets the price pxii that maximizes her domestic profit pi
x
ii. This
price is given by
pxii =
σ
σ − 1
,
i.e., the firm applies a constant mark-up to unit production costs. Her domestic after-tax profit is
then given by pixii = κθiP
σ−1
i ϕi, where κ ≡ µLσ
−σ(σ − 1)σ−1 > 0 is a positive bundle of parameters.
Analogously, the independent distributor maximizes his after-tax profit
pidj ≡ θj
(
pdij − r
x
i τ
d
ij
)
qdijϕi, (6)
where rxi τ
d
ij is the full transfer price he pays to the exporter for each unit that he supplies to the
market; and where qdij ≡ qij(p
d
ij). This full transfer price includes the transport cost imputed to
the distributor in the destination country. Maximizing (6) with respect to pdij yields the consumer
price
pdij =
σ
σ − 1
rxi τ
d
ij ,
so that the distributor’s and the exporter’s profits are given by
pidj = κθjP
σ−1
j
(
rxi τ
d
ij
)1−σ
ϕi and pi
x
ij = κθi(σ − 1)P
σ−1
j
(
rxi τ
d
ij − τ
) (
rxi τ
d
ij
)
−σ. (7)
Note that the independent distributor and the exporter are concerned only with the full transfer
price rxi τ
d
ij , which thus becomes the unique decision variable to negotiate on.
In the first stage, we assume a Nash bargaining process, where 0 < α < 1 stands for the
distributor’s bargaining power. The transfer price and the transport cost imputation maximize
the Nash product N =
[
pidj
]α [
pixij
]1−α
, where the price indices Pi for i = 1, 2 are taken as given.
This product is a function of the full transfer price rxi τ
d
ij, which implies that the imputation of
transport costs has no impact on the bargaining outcome. In other words, any change in the
imputation of transport costs results in an equal opposite change in the equilibrium transfer price.
This yields our first result, namely that exporters are indifferent to the imputation of the transport
costs. The unique solution to the maximization of N is computed as
rxi τ
d
ij = βτ, where β ≡
σ − α
σ − 1
. (8)
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The parameter β is a measure of the inefficiency of the arm’s length relationship in the exporter
structure. It measures the mark-up over the marginal cost τ that the exporter includes in her
external transfer price. The transfer price and the market price are then equal to:
rxi = βτ
x
ii and p
d
ij =
σ
σ − 1
βτ. (9)
There is obviously a double marginalization issue as the exporter and the independent distributor
do not internalize the impact of their pricing decisions on each other’s profit. This issue becomes
less severe as the bargaining power of the distributor increases: the full transfer price rxi τ
d
ij is equal
to the cost τ of serving the export market when the independent distributor has all bargaining
power (α = 1). In this case, he decides on both the external transfer price and the consumer price.
Using expressions (9), the exporter’s after-tax profit can be decomposed into its domestic and
foreign parts as follows:
pixii = κθiP
σ−1
i ϕi and pi
x
ij = κθiP
σ−1
j τ
1−σγ, (10)
where γ ≡ β−σ(β−1)(σ−1) ∈ (0, 1/e) and where e ≡ 2.71828 . . . is Euler’s number. The parameter
γ captures the disadvantage of serving the foreign market through an independent distributor. It
increases with σ and falls with α.
Let us summarize the foregoing results as follows.
Proposition 1 (i) Exporters are indifferent to the imputation of transport costs. (ii) Exporters
incur a cost because of the inefficiency of their arm’s length relationship with the independent
distributor.
Although specific to the Dixit-Stiglitz model with iceberg transport costs, the first result is impor-
tant as this model is a natural benchmark in international economics. It dispells any ambiguity
about the imputation of transport costs and eases the subsequent analysis about firms’ organiza-
tional choices and consumers’ benefits.
4 Multinational structure
Contrary to exporters, multinationals can shift profits between their units using internal transfer
prices. They can also minimize their tax liability using an appropriate imputation of transport
costs across their units. By integrating their upstream and downstream activities across countries,
multinationals also avoid the inefficiencies of arm’s length relationships with an independent dis-
tributor since the multinational retains the full control over its consumer prices. By contrast, the
multinational has to incur itself the marketing cost.
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We focus on a multinational v producing in country i, and we again suppress the variety
index v. Variables pertaining to multinationals carry no superscripts. The multinational sets
its domestic and foreign product prices pii and pij, its internal transfer price ri and its domestic
and foreign imputation of transport costs, τii and τij where τiiτij = τ . Sales of pijqij dollars
in the foreign market require to supply the foreign unit with a value of τijpijqij dollars and to
produce domestically for a value of τiiτijpijqij dollars. Internal shipments are given an accounting
value of riτijpijqij dollars. All values are deflated by the variety-specific marketing parameter ϕi.
Therefore, the multinational’s profit includes three terms: (i) the profit from domestic sales taxed
at the domestic rate
piii ≡ θi (pii − 1) qiiϕi; (11)
(ii) the profit declared by the foreign affiliate taxed at the foreign rate
piforij ≡ θj (pijqij − riτijqij)ϕi; (12)
(iii) the profit declared by the domestic affiliate from its sales to her foreign affiliate, taxed at the
domestic rate
pidomij ≡ θi (riτijqij − τiiτijqij)ϕi. (13)
Expressions (12) and (13) can be added to give the after-tax profits from foreign sales
piij ≡ pi
for
ij + pi
dom
ij = θj (pij − Ri) qijϕi (14)
where qii ≡ qii(pii) and qij ≡ qij(pij); and where
Ri ≡ riτij −
θi
θj
(riτij − τ ) (15)
measures the multinational’s tax-adjusted marginal cost of serving the foreign market.8 Note that
expression (15) shows that the tax-adjusted marginal cost is a convex combination of the multina-
tional’s marginal cost and the full transfer price. As in the exporter structure, the multinational
only cares about the full transfer price riτij . However, in contrast to an exporter, the multinational
may not be allowed to freely set its internal transfer price ri because of restrictions imposed by the
tax authorities. Hence, the imputation of transport costs is a priori ambiguous and may depend
on transfer pricing rules. Finally, the multinational’s total profit is given by Πi ≡ piii + piij .
We now analyze the multinational’s pricing decisions under various transfer pricing rules. First,
we analyze the two benchmark cases of perfect audit and no audit, where tax authorities are able
either to acquire full information on true production costs or no information at all, respectively.
8By analogy with Hyde and Choe’s (2005) double accounting system, where firms keep two sets of books, Ri is
the cost accounting figure used for managerial incentive purposes whereas ri is the fiscal accounting figure used for
tax purposes.
11
Then, we analyze the pricing decisions of the multinational under the two transfer pricing rules
of comparable uncontrolled pricing (CUP) and cost-plus. We assume that multinationals comply
with the transfer prices enforced by tax authorities whenever the latter do decide on a particular
rule. Put differently, we disregard the issues of non-compliance and penalties that tax authorities
may impose (see, e.g., Hyde and Choe, 2005; Choe and Hyde, 2007).
4.1 Perfect audit
Suppose that tax authorities are able to acquire perfect information about the cost τii at which
the multinational supplies the good to her foreign unit, and impose the constraint ri = τii on the
multinational’s transfer price. Under this transfer pricing rule, the multinational’s imputation of
its transport cost does not affect her full transfer price riτij and hence her tax-adjusted marginal
cost Ri, which are both constant and equal to τ . Hence, the imputation of transport costs does
not affect prices and profits.
More specifically, the multinational producing in country i chooses pii and pij to maximize her
profit, given by
Πi = θi(pii − 1)qiiϕi + θj(pij − τ)qijϕi.
It is readily verified that her profit-maximizing prices are as follows
poii =
σ
σ − 1
and poij =
σ
σ − 1
τ, (16)
where we use the superscript o for the perfect audit case. Her profits from the domestic and foreign
sales are given by
pioii = κθiP
σ−1
i ϕi and pi
o
ij = κθjP
σ−1
j τ
1−σϕi. (17)
4.2 No audit
Suppose now that tax authorities are unable to acquire information about the multinational’s costs
and to impose any transfer price. Unconstrained multinationals are however willing to declare losses
to claim tax credits in the high tax country 1. Yet, no tax authority will indefinitely grant tax
credits to multinationals which repeatedly declare losses. In our static model, this means that tax
authorities constrain the multinationals to declare non-negative profits in their jurisdiction.
The multinational finds the prices pii and pij , the transfer price ri and the transport cost
imputation τii and τij that maximize its total profit Πi subject to the constaints piii+pi
dom
ij ≥ 0 and
piforij ≥ 0. As expected, the multinational shifts all the profits generated in the high tax country to
the low tax country, and sets the same prices as those it would set in the absence of taxes (see the
proof in the Appendix):
p∗ii =
σ
σ − 1
and p∗ij =
σ
σ − 1
τ, (18)
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where the superscript ∗ stands for the no audit case. Since those prices are independent of τii and
τij , the multinational is indifferent as to the imputation of its transport costs. Because the tax is
lower in country 2, the after-tax profits in each market are given by
pi∗ii = κθ2P
σ−1
i ϕi and pi
∗
ij = κθ2P
σ−1
j τ
1−σϕi. (19)
The two benchmark cases of perfect audit and no audit are hardly realistic as they assume
either a too myopic or a too sophisticated behavior on behalf of tax authorities. Tax authorities do
realize that firms can use transfer prices to shift profits and therefore use various transfer pricing
rules to constrain the firms. We now examine in more detail the two most frequently used rules
which are recommended by the OECD.
4.3 Comparable uncontrolled price
The most widely used transfer pricing rule recommended by the OECD is the Comparable Uncon-
trolled Price (henceforth, CUP). Under CUP, the tax authorities constrain the multinationals to
set their transfer prices to the price of a comparable uncontrolled transaction with an independent
firm (the so-called arm’s length principle). According to the OECD (2001, Chap. II-2.11), “the
CUP method is a particularly reliable method where an independent entreprise sells the same
product as is sold between two associated enterprises.” However, comparing different transactions
is not easy. The OECD recognizes that particular care should be taken for the accounting of
transport costs and of product differentiation (OECD, 2001, Chap. II-2.15–2.19).
Since varieties are symmetric in our model, a valid basis for price comparisons is given by the
prices prevailing in the relationship between the exporter in country i and the independent distrib-
utor in country j. The tax authority observes the total cost borne by the independent distributor
for each unit it sells which, by (8), is equal to rxi τ
d
ij = βτ . This is precisely the comparable un-
controlled price that the tax authorities impose on transactions within the multinationals. Hence,
under the CUP rule, the transfer prices of multinationals producing in country i are restricted,
such that
riτij = r
x
i τ
d
ij = βτ ⇐⇒ ri = βτii,
where we have used the identity τiiτij = τ . As in the case of no audit, multinational affiliates may
end up declaring permanent losses by setting their sales price pij below their full transfer price
riτij . Thus, to avoid perpetual tax credits, tax authorities impose pij ≥ riτij so that pi
for
ij ≥ 0.
9
Suppose first that multinationals have no incentives to declare losses in their foreign market.
Using (15), the tax-adjusted marginal cost of serving the foreign market is given by
Ri = τ
[
β −
θi
θj
(β − 1)
]
9Multinationals declare positive profits in their country of production, piii + pi
dom
ii > 0, because riτij = βτ ≥ τ .
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so that the optimal product prices are
pcii =
σ
σ − 1
and pcij =
σ
σ − 1
Ri, (20)
where superscript c denotes the variables under the CUP rule. The multinationals have no incen-
tives to declare losses when pij ≥ riτij , which is equivalent to
θj
θi
≥ θ̂, where θ̂ ≡
σ (β − 1)
β
=
σ(1− α)
σ − α
∈ (0, 1). (21)
The above inequality is always satisfied for multinationals producing in the high tax country i = 1
because θ2/θ1 ≥ 1. It is satisfied for multinationals producing in the low tax country i = 2 if and
only if θ1/θ2 ≥ θ̂.
Two points are worth noting. First, under CUP, the multinational is indifferent as to the
imputation τii and τij of transport costs. This is because multinationals only care about the full
transfer price riτij , which is exactly the comparable uncontrolled price that the tax authorities
observe from the relationship between exporters and distributors. Any change in the transport
cost imputation is offset by a change in the transfer price.
Second, the CUP transfer price is affected by the inefficiency existing in the arm’s length re-
lationship between exporters and distributors, since the latter is used as a point of comparison.
A larger inefficiency β translates into a higher transfer price ri, which itself makes tax-adjusted
marginal costs diverge: R1 ≥ τ ≥ R2. The upward bias on the transfer price is not profitable
for the multinationals that produce in the high tax country 1 and that want to shift profits into
the other country. Because R1 ≥ τ , those multinationals have incentives to reduce their domestic
tax base by reducing their shipments to the foreign market and to increase their foreign tax base
by selling at a higher price there. Conversely, the upward bias on the transfer price is profitable
for the multinationals that produce in the low tax country 2 and that want to shift profits into
that country. Because R2 ≤ τ , those multinationals have incentives to expand their domestic tax
base by increasing their shipments to the foreign market and by reducing their foreign tax base by
selling at a lower price there. Hence, the CUP transfer prices yield under-production by the multi-
nationals producing in the high tax country; and over-production by the multinationals producing
in the low tax country.
The profits generated in each market are given by
picii = κθiP
σ−1
i ϕi and pi
c
ij = κθjP
σ−1
j R
1−σ
i ϕi if θj/θi ≥ θ̂. (22)
Suppose finally that multinationals have incentives to declare losses in their foreign market.
This happens for multinationals producing in the low tax country 2 when θ1/θ2 < θ̂. The tax
authority in the high tax country 1 constrains those multinationals to erase their permanent losses
by setting p21 = r2τ21, and imposes the full transfer price r2τ21 = βτ . Because the latter price
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is independent of the transport cost imputation τ22 and τ21, multinationals are again indifferent
with regard to that imputation. One can verify that p21 is smaller than the corresponding price
under perfect audit and under no audit, i.e., the firm has an incentive to produce too much. At
this price, a multinational producing in the low tax country 2 repartiates the following profit from
foreign sales:
(pidom21 )
c = κθ2P
σ−1
1 τ
1−σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)σ
γϕ2 if θ1/θ2 < θ̂. (23)
4.4 Cost plus
The second most widely used transfer pricing rule recommended by the OECD is the Cost Plus
rule (henceforth, CP). Under CP, the tax authorities compute the transfer price by applying an
‘appropriate’ margin to the cost of multinationals. The OECD (2001, Chap. II-11) recommends
that “an appropriate mark-up is [. . .] added to [the multinational’s] cost, to make an appropriate
profit in the light of functions performed and the market conditions.” The tax authorities have
several ways to estimate what is an ‘appropriate margin’, depending on their information about
the technology and the market conditions of the industry. In most cases, the tax authorities ask
for a succinct industry survey in the country where the multinational produces to obtain a rough
estimate of the mark-ups in that industry.
Let the tax authorities in country i define the ‘appropriate’ margin using the aggregate measure
ηi ≡ si
ri − τii
τii
+ (1− si)
rxi − τ
x
ii
τxii
, (24)
where the mark-ups contain the transfer prices ri and the production plus transport costs τii borne
by the multinational producer established in country i; and where 0 < si < 1 and 1 − si are the
weights put on multinationals’ and exporters’ mark-ups, respectively. For example, the weight on
multinationals’ mark-ups is equal to si = mi/(mi + xi) if the tax authorities weight mark-ups by
the mass of firms; whereas it is equal to si = miq
c
i/(miq
c
i + xiq
x
i ) if it weights mark-ups by output
volumes.
We first consider a multinational that produces in the high tax country 1 and that wants to
shift profits into the low tax country 2 by using a low transfer price r1. Since the low tax country
always gains from multinationals’ tax avoidance, this country does not impose restrictions on the
multinational’s transfer price. We thus just need to study the behavior of the tax authorities in
the high tax country 1. Under the CP rule, the tax authorities in the high tax country use η1 as
a lower bound on the mark-ups of domestic multinationals:
η1 ≤
r1 − τ11
τ11
⇐⇒ r1 ≥ τ11(1 + η1). (25)
This constraint prevents firms from shifting too much profit by transferring the good at too low
a price. Consider next a multinational that produces in the low tax country 2 and that wants to
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shift profits to its domestic production unit through a high transfer price. The tax authorities use
η2 as an upper bound on the mark-ups so that
η2 ≥
r2 − τ22
τ22
⇐⇒ r2 ≤ τ22(1 + η2). (26)
We now compute the ‘appropriate’ margins η1 and η2 consistent with equilibrium. The ‘ap-
propriate’ margins depend on transfer prices, while transfer prices depend on the constraints on
the ‘appropriate’ margins. In equilibrium, those constraints must be consistent with the transfer
prices. Let us first suppose that multinationals have no incentive to declare perpetual losses. They
set their transfer prices so that the foregoing constraints on ‘appropriate’ margins are binding. The
equilibrium is readily computed by replacing (ri − τii) /τii by ηi in expression (24) and by using r
x
i
as defined by (9). We successively get
ηi = siηi + (1− si)
1
τdij
rxi τ
d
ij − τ
τxii
= siηi + (1− si)(β − 1), i = 1, 2,
which reduces to ηi = β−1. As a result, the weighting scheme used for computing the ‘appropriate’
margin is immaterial for the equilibrium value of this margin. Furthermore, using the binding
constraints (25) and (26), we obtain the transfer price under CP given by
ri = βτii.
Hence, multinationals are imposed the same constraint under CUP and CP transfer pricing rules,
so that their total profits are the same. The two main results pertaining to CUP apply to CP:
(i) multinationals are indifferent as to the imputation of transport costs and (ii) transfer prices
are affected by the inefficiency existing in the arm’s length relationship between exporters and
independent distributors. As under the CUP transfer pricing rule, multinationals producing in
the low tax country 2 have incentives to declare perpetual losses in their foreign market when
θ1/θ2 < θ̂. Since they are not allowed to declare losses, the multinationals set their break-even
price p21 = r2τ21. It can be shown that CUP and CP remain equivalent when θ1/θ2 < θ̂.
4.5 Summary and discussion
The foregoing sections provide a simple answer to the question about the impact of international
tax differentials on firms’ imputation of transport costs: tax differentials do not matter for that
imputation. Furthermore, they also give a simple answer to the question about the possible dif-
ferences between CUP and CP transfer pricing rules: there are no differences in our model. Our
foregoing results on the multinationals’ pricing decisions may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 (i) Multinationals are indifferent as to the imputation of transport costs under
perfect audit, no audit, CUP and CP transfer pricing rules. (ii) CUP and CP transfer pricing
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rules are equivalent. Prices, production incentives and profits are the same under both rules, and
the transfer prices reflect the inefficiency existing in the arm’s length relationship. (iii) Compared
to the perfect audit and no audit cases, multinationals producing in the high tax country ship too
little to their export market, whereas multinationals producing in the low tax country ship too much
to their export market.
Note that the inefficiency with CUP and CP transfer pricing is related to the additional mark-up
that is present in the arm’s length relationship between exporters and independent distributors.
The transfer prices are thus above the ‘technological cost’ τ of serving foreign markets. This
inefficiency decreases when product varieties become better substitutes. Indeed, β falls as σ rises.
In the limit, β → 1 when σ →∞, in which case the inefficiency entirely vanishes. More formally:
Corollary 1 When products are close to perfect substitutes (σ → ∞), the CUP and CP transfer
pricing rules yield the same transfer prices as under perfect audit.
Corollary 1 provides an economic rationale for the OECD guidelines. However, it also prompts us
to be careful. Firstly, the CUP and CP rules only converge to the perfect audit case in the limit
of a perfectly competitive industry; those rules yield quite different outcomes otherwise. Secondly,
at this competitive limit, profits tend to zero so that taxation and the choice of a transfer pricing
rule become irrelevant issues. Finally, even very small profits can still be ranked under different
organizational structures. Hence, firms may not choose the same structure under the different
transfer pricing rules even when goods are very close substitutes. We will turn to this issue in the
next section by examining more closely firms’ organizational structure.
5 Choice of organizational structure
We now turn to the firms’ choices of organizational structure. Recall that a firm can either
export its goods by relying on an independent distributor in the foreign market, or it can become a
multinational operating a fully owned foreign affiliate. Inefficiencies in the arm’s length relationship
with the distributor as well as tax considerations provide incentives for ‘going multinational’.
In what follows, to isolate the ‘pure’ effects of transfer pricing rules on firms’ organizational
choices, we remove compositional effects by assuming that each country has the same firm distri-
bution. More specifically, we assume that in each country the variety-specific efficiency parameters
ϕi(v) are distributed according to the cdf F (ϕ) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and F
′ > 0. Hence F is simply the
inverse of ϕi. In each country i, a firm v with ϕi(v) chooses to operate a multinational structure
if doing so yields higher profits than being an exporter:
piii + piij ≥ pi
x
ii + pi
x
ij (27)
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Note that the multinational’s profit on foreign sales piij depends on its efficiency parameter ϕi(v),
whereas its revenue from sales to the distributor pixij does not depend on it (as the distributor bears
the distribution costs).
We first analyze the choice of organizational structure in the perfect audit and in the no audit
benchmark cases. We then turn to the OECD rules and finally compare the different cases.
5.1 Perfect audit
When the tax authorities can perfectly monitor the multinationals, they apply a transfer price
equal to τ . Each firm compares its profits as a multinational (17) with its profits as an exporter
(10). A firm v producing in country i chooses a multinational structure if its variety-specific
efficiency parameter ϕi(v) exceeds the threshold
ϕoi ≡
θi
θj
γ,
whereas it chooses an exporter structure otherwise. Country i hence hosts a mass of exporters
F (ϕoi ) and a mass of multinationals 1 − F (ϕ
o
i ). Two comments are in order. First, although tax
authorities are able to impose the ‘right’ transfer price, they cannot correct the inefficiencies in the
arm’s length relationship between exporters and distributors. Larger inefficiencies imply a smaller
value of γ, which reduces the thresholds ϕoi and yields fewer exporters in both countries. Second,
since θ1 < θ2, we have 0 < ϕ
o
1 < γ < ϕ
o
2. The mass of multinationals in the high tax country
1−F (ϕo1) therefore exceeds the mass of multinationals in the low tax country 1−F (ϕ
o
2). Compared
to exporters, multinationals pay more taxes on the profits made in the high tax country 1. By
contrast, exporters can repatriate some of those profits through the mark-ups that they negotiate
with the independent distributors. Hence, firms producing in the low tax country 2 have smaller
incentives to adopt a multinational structure. In contrast, firms producing in the high tax country
1 prefer a multinational structure because all their foreign profits generated in the low tax country
are taxed there.
5.2 No audit
Suppose next that tax authorities are unable to acquire information about the multinationals’
costs and do, therefore, not impose any transfer price. Multinationals can then shift all their
profits to the low tax country 2 and are thus fully taxed at the lowest rate. The trade-off between
an exporter structure and a multinational structure is clear for the firms producing in the low
tax country 2. Since multinationals and exporters are taxed at the same rate there, taxation is
irrelevant to their choice which is only driven by the trade-off between the inefficiencies in the arm’s
length relationship and the variety-specific marketing inefficiency they incur as a multinational.
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Comparing expressions (10) and (19) reveals that a firm v producing in the high tax country
2 chooses a multinational structure if and only if its variety-specific efficiency parameter ϕ2(v)
exceeds the threshold
ϕ∗2 ≡ γ.
Conversely, the firms producing in the high tax country 1 face a slightly different trade-off because
their profits in each market are taxed differently depending on their choice of structure. Comparing
expressions (10) and (19) reveals that a firm v chooses the multinational structure if and only if
its variety-specific efficiency parameter ϕ1(v) exceeds the threshold
ϕ∗1 ≡
θ1
θ2
γ −
(
1−
θ1
θ2
)(
P1
P2
)σ−1
τσ−1.
Since θ1 < θ2, we have ϕ
∗
1 < ϕ
∗
2. Hence, firms producing in the high tax country 1 also have larger
incentives to adopt a multinational structure. The mass of multinationals producing in the high
tax country 1−F (ϕ∗1) indeed exceeds the mass of multinationals producing in the low tax country
1−F (ϕ∗2). Observe that the multinationals producing in country 1 can avoid the taxes that country
1 exporters must pay on the profit generated by foreign sales. In contrast, the multinationals
producing in country 2 cannot avoid such taxes. They can only alleviate the inefficiency arising in
the arm’s length relationship. Their incentives to go multinational are therefore weaker.
Having analyzed the two benchmark cases, we now turn to the impact of the OECD transfer
pricing rules on firms’ organizational choices.
5.3 OECD transfer pricing rules
As shown by Proposition 2, firms make the same pricing and output choices under CUP and CP
transfer pricing rules. We may hence restrict our analysis to the CUP rule. Recall from Subsection
4.3 that if θj/θi > θ̂, the tax authorities impose the transfer price ri = βτii to multinationals
producing in i. Comparing expression (10) and (22) reveals that a firm v producing in country
i chooses the multinational structure if and only if its variety-specific efficiency parameter ϕi(v)
exceeds the threshold
ϕci ≡ γ
θi
θj
(
Ri
τ
)σ−1
= γ
θi
θj
[
β −
θi
θj
(β − 1)
]σ−1
. (28)
Observe that (28) is affected by both the tax differential and by the inefficiency in the arm’s length
relationship between exporters and distributors. Because θ1 < θ2, expression (28) always applies
to firms producing in the high tax country i = 1, where it applies to firms producing in the low
tax country i = 2 only if the tax differential is small enough (θ1/θ2 > θ̂). For a large enough tax
differential (θ1/θ2 > θ̂), multinationals producing in country 2 are constrained to report no losses.
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Their profits under a multinational structure (23) then exceed their profits under an exporter
structure (10) if ϕ2(v) is larger then
ϕ˜c2 ≡
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
.
We can now compare the firms’ organizational choices in both countries. One can readily
verify that ϕc1 < γ < ϕ
c
2 ≤ ϕ˜
c
2. Consequently, firms producing in the low tax country 2 have smaller
incentives to adopt a multinational structure so that the mass of multinationals producing in the
low tax country 1 − F (ϕc2) is smaller than the mass of multinationals producing in the high tax
country 1− F (ϕc1). This conclusion concurs with the two benchmark cases.
It is instructive to compare the OECD rules with the perfect audit case by re-writing expression
(28) as ϕci = ϕ
o
i (Ri/τ)
σ−1. The incentives for going multinational are thus similar to the perfect
audit case safe for a corrective term including the tax-adjusted marginal cost Ri of serving the
foreign market. On the one hand, this tax-adjusted marginal cost exceeds τ for multinationals
producing in the high tax country 1, thus implying that ϕc1 > ϕ
o
1. Put differently, the firms
producing in the high tax country 1 have less incentives to choose a multinational structure than
under perfect audit. The reason is that the CUP transfer price is too large and therefore forces
the multinational to shift too much profit into her affiliate producing in the high tax country 1.
Although those multinationals minimize this loss by under-producing for the foreign market, they
still see their profits fall, thus making them worse off than under perfect audit. Conversely, for
multinationals producing in the low tax country 2, R2 < τ , which implies that ϕ
c
2 < ϕ
o
2. Hence, the
firms producing in the low tax country 2 have larger incentives to choose a multinational structure
than under perfect audit. The reason is that the larger CUP transfer price enables these firms to
shift profits to the low tax country 1 by over-producing for the foreign market, which is beneficial
to them.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Firms’ organizational choices are summarized by Figure 2, which depicts the loci of the above
thresholds under perfect audit (o), no audit (∗), as well as CUP and CP transfer pricing rules
(c). In each case, the vertical distance of ϕ from the x-axis measures the mass of exporters
F (ϕ), whereas the vertical distance between ϕ and the top of the figure measures the mass of
multinationals 1 − F (ϕ). Some computations, using the foregoing results, allow us to rank the
thresholds as follows (see the Appendix for additional details):
ϕ∗1 < ϕ
o
1 < ϕ
c
1 < ϕ
∗
2 < ϕ
c
2 < ϕ
o
2 (29)
We can furthermore show that the thresholds (ϕ∗1, ϕ
o
1, ϕ
c
1) are increasing functions of the tax differ-
ential θ1/θ2, whereas the thresholds (ϕ
c
2, ϕ
o
2) are decreasing functions of it. Note that all thresholds
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tend to γ as the tax differential vanishes (θ1/θ2 → 1). In other words, when tax differences are very
small, firms’ organizational choices solely reflect the trade-off between the inefficiency in the arm’s
length relationship between exporters and distributors and the variety-specific marketing ineffi-
ciency of multinationals. When tax differentials get larger (θ1/θ2 decreases), the firms producing
in the high tax country 1 have larger incentives to choose the multinational structure, whereas
those producing in the low tax country 2 have larger incentives to choose the exporter structure.
Hence, the firms’ organizational incentives diverge across countries as tax differences grow larger.
Let us summarize the foregoing results as follows.
Proposition 3 (i) Firms’ incentives to choose a multinational structure are always larger in the
high tax country (ϕk1 < ϕ
k
2, for k = o, ∗, c). (ii) In the high tax country, the incentives to choose
a multinational structure are always lower under CUP and CP than under perfect audit and no
audit (ϕ∗1 < ϕ
o
1 < ϕ
c
1). (iii) Firms’ incentives to choose a multinational structure in the low tax
country lie between the incentives under perfect audit and no audit (ϕ∗2 < ϕ
c
2 < ϕ
o
2). (iv) Those
incentives diverge as tax differences increase (i.e., as θ1/θ2 decreases).
Note that the foregoing results also hold when products become close to perfect substitutes (i.e.,
σ →∞). Despite the equivalence of transfer prices shown in Corollary 1, the profits made by the
firms under the different transfer pricing rules are not the same, so that firms are not indifferent
as to their organizational structure. We summarize this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 When products becomes very close substitutes (σ →∞), the mass of firms choosing
a multinational structure under CUP and CP does not converge to their mass under full audit.
The ranking (29) continues to apply.
Having characterized firms’ organizational choices under the different transfer pricing rules, we
now investigate the efficiency properties of those choices. In so doing, we will focus on consumer’s
utility as this is an aspect that is usually disregarded in the discussion on the desirability of the
design of transfer prices.
6 Consumer’s utility
The OECD transfer pricing rules are designed to help tax authorities and multinationals to find
mutually satisfying solutions to transfer pricing disputes, thereby minimizing conflict and costly
litigation. Those rules are also presented as a means to achieve the OECD’s objectives: to promote
a high standard of living and the efficient use of economic resources. In the hypothetical context
of perfect competition, transfer pricing rules should help tax authorities to assess the true transfer
prices and to alleviate market distortions generated by tax differentials across countries. Transfer
21
pricing rules do, however, no longer achieve these goals in the context of imperfect competition
when firms’ prices and organizational structures differ from the efficient ones. In such a case, some
consumers may loose from transfer pricing rules, while others may gain. The literature on transfer
pricing has predominantly focused on tax revenue and production efficiency. Less attention has
been devoted to how transfer pricing rules affect the ‘standard of living’, i.e., consumers’ utility.
This is the focus of this section. To ease the presentation, we restrict our analysis to the case of
sufficiently small tax differentials, i.e., θ1/θ2 > θ̂ as defined in (21). This restriction concurs with
the OECD case where corporate profits tax differentials rarely exceed 40%.
Let r = o, ∗, c denote the different transfer pricing rules (no audit, full audit, or the OECD
rules). The consumer’s utility (5) is an increasing function of the CES price index
P
1−σ
i ≡ (p
r
ii)
1−σ + (1−mj)
(
pxji
)1−σ
+mj
(
prji
)1−σ
=
[
(prii)
1−σ +
(
pxji
)1−σ]
+mj
[(
prji
)1−σ
−
(
pxji
)1−σ]
. (30)
Using the foregoing results of Sections 3 and 4, we know that prii = σ/(σ − 1) and that p
x
ji =
βτσ/(σ− 1), both of which are independent of the transfert pricing rules, the location of multina-
tionals, and the location of consumers. Hence, the first bracket in expression (30) is constant. A
transfer pricing rule r has two effects on consumer’s utility in country i. First, there is an effect at
the intensive margin through their impact on foreign multinationals’ prices prji for serving market
i. Second, there is an effect at the extensive margin through their impact on the mass of foreign
multinationals mj. We study each of those effects in turn.
Intensive margin. Expressions (9), (16), (18) and (20) allow us to rank the sales prices in the
foreign markets as follows:
pc21 < p
o
ij = p
∗
ij < p
c
12 < p
x
ij, ∀i, j and i 6= j. (31)
Observe that the highest prices pxij are always set by the independent distributors, which is due to
the double marginalization arising in the arm’s lenght relationship. The lowest prices pc21 are set
by the multinationals that ship from the low tax country 2 to the high tax country 1 under the
OECD rules. Since their transfer prices exceed their marginal costs, those firms cut their prices to
inflate their shipments to the high tax country which allows them to transfer back profits into the
low tax country. By contrast, the multinationals shipping from the high tax country 1 set a high
sales price pc12 in the foreign market in order to inflate their foreign profits and benefit from the
low tax rate there.
As the tax differential between countries 1 and 2 widens (θ1/θ2 decreases), the gap in multi-
nationals’ sales prices also widens across countries, which provides a consumption advantage to
country 1 because its imports get cheaper (pc21 < p
c
12). This advantage is magnified by larger
tax differences. Hence, for a given industry structure, the high tax country has access to cheaper
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products under OECD rules. To clarify this point, let us study the intensive margin by focusing
on the firms’ structure in the absence of tax differential. In that case, since mr1 = m
r
2 = 1− F (γ),
the mass of exporters remains constant and consumers’ utility only depends inversely on multi-
nationals’ sales prices. Because pxji > p
r
ji for all r, expression (31) implies that for this fixed
structure
U c2 < U
o
i = U
∗
i < U
c
1
Hence, as tax differentials increase, prices and consumers’ utility remain the same under perfect
audit and under no audit; whereas prices and consumers’ utility diverge under OECD rules. In the
latter case, this provides a consumption advantage (resp., disadvantage) to the high (resp., low)
tax country.
Extensive margin. Transfer pricing rules have extensive margin effects since they influence
firms’ organizational structure. Because the mass of multinationals mri is equal to 1− F (ϕ
r
i ), we
can make use of (29) to derive the following ranking:
mo2 < m
c
2 < m
∗
2 < m
c
1 < m
o
1 < m
∗
1
In words, the high tax country 1 has the largest mass of multinationals under perfect audit while
the low tax country 2 has the lowest mass under no audit. As can be seen from Figure 2, firms’
structures diverge as tax differentials increase: more firms choose to become multinationals in
the high tax country 1 and more firms choose the exporter structure in the low tax country 2.
Thus, for given prices, the high tax country is served by more exporters through independent
distributors whereas the low tax country is served by more multinationals through their affiliates.
Because independent distributors set the highest prices, consumers in the high tax country lose
while those in the low tax country gain. To clarify this point, let us again look at the case without
tax differences (in which case prij = p
o
ij = p
∗
ij = βτσ(σ− 1)). Because consumers’ utility in country
i depends on the mass of multinationals in the other country, we readily obtain
U∗1 < U
o
1 < U
c
1 < U
∗
2 < U
c
2 < U
o
2 .
Firms’ organizational choices bestow a consumption disadvantage (resp., advantage) upon con-
sumers residing in the high (resp., low) tax country. One can show that the extensive margin
effect is stronger for larger tax differentials. Nevertheless, this effect goes in the opposite direction
of the intensive margin effect, so that the combined effect is a priori unclear.
Combined margins. We first study the cross-country differences in consumers’ utility for a
given transfer pricing rule. Because there is no intensive margin effect under either perfect audit
or no audit, the extensive margin effect trivially dominates under those rules:
Uo1 < U
o
2 and U
∗
1 < U
∗
2 .
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Hence, consumers’ utility is lower in the high tax country 1 because more firms choose an exporter
structure in other country to escape taxation and, therefore, increase the number of distributors
and price inefficiencies in serving the high tax country. Under OECD rules, we have
U c1 > U
c
2 ⇐⇒
mc2
mc1
=
1− F
[
γ θ2
θ1
(
R2
τ
)σ−1]
1− F
[
γ θ1
θ2
(
R1
τ
)σ−1] >
(
βτ
R1
)σ−1
− 1(
βτ
R2
)σ−1
− 1
(32)
which is independent of transport costs τ because Ri is proportional to τ . Since the two sides
of this inequality are smaller than one, it does not generally hold. Nevertheless, as shown in the
Appendix, this condition is always satisfied when tax differentials are small (θ1/θ2 → 1) and when
the distribution F is uniform, F (ϕ) = ϕ. Under those conditions, the intensive margin effect
dominates the extensive margin effect: consumers are better off in the high tax country 1 because
they benefit more from the cheaper imports from their foreign multinationals than they lose from
the increased presence of distributors who charge higher prices.
Proposition 4 (i) Consumers’ utility is lower in the high tax country than in the low tax country
under perfect audit and no audit. (ii) The opposite result holds true under OECD rules for small tax
differences and for a uniform distribution of the efficiency parameters ϕi. (iii) The cross-country
gap in consumers’ utility widens as tax differentials increase.
Last, we study the differences in consumers’ utility between different transfer pricing rules. A
transfer pricing rule r yields higher consumer utility in country i than another rule s if
U ri > U
s
i ⇐⇒ P
r
i < P
s
i ⇐⇒
mrj
msj
>
(
pxji/p
s
ji
)σ−1
− 1(
pxji/p
r
ji
)σ−1
− 1
.
We readily obtain
Uo1 < min{U
∗
1 , U
c
1} and U
c
2 < U
o
2 < U
∗
2 .
Furthermore
U∗1 < U
c
1 ⇐⇒
mc2
m∗2
=
1− F
[
γ 1
θ
(
R2
τ
)σ−1]
1− F (γ)
>
βσ−1 − 1
(βτ/R2)
σ−1 − 1
(33)
As is the case with (32), the latter inequality does not depend on τ because Ri is proportional
to τ . Yet, it cannot be clearly signed without some additional assumptions. As before, we can
show that this inequality is always satisfied when tax differences are small and in the case of a
uniform distribution of ϕi. We can summarize those results, taking the no audit case as a natural
benchmark, as follows.
24
Proposition 5 (i) Consumers’ utility falls in both countries when tax authorities switch from no
audit to perfect audit. (ii) Consumers’ utility falls even more in the low tax country, but it increases
in the high tax country, when tax authorities switch from no audit to OECD rules, provided that
tax differences are small and that the distribution of the efficiency parameters ϕi is uniform.
When tax authorities switch from no audit to perfect audit, more firms choose a multinational
structure to avoid taxation. Consequently, there are less inefficient exporter-distributor arm’s
length relationships. Since multinationals do not distort their prices under perfect audit, prices
fall on average. By contrast, when tax authorities switch from no audit to OECD rules, consumers
are better off in the high tax country 1 because they benefit from lower prices set by multinationals
producing in the foreign country. In the low tax country 2, consumers are worse off because foreign
multinationals inflate their prices there and reduce quantities shipped to benefit from the low tax
rates.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a monopolistic competition model that analyzes the impacts of OECD trans-
fer pricing rules on firms’ market decisions, their organizational choices, and consumers’ utility.
Multinationals compete with exporters, and the arm’s length relationships between exporters and
independent distributors serve as a natural benchmark for tax authorities to gauge the multina-
tionals’ profit shifting behavior.
Using as benchmarks the cases where the tax authorities are either unable to audit the multina-
tionals or are able to audit them perfectly, we have shown that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price
and the Cost-Plus method suggested by the OECD are equivalent. In the high tax country, the
incentives to operate a multinational structure with fully owned and controlled affiliates are lower
than under both benchmarks when OECD rules are enforced. Firms are thus more likely to adopt
an exporter structure using an independent distributor, which directly affects the market outcome
because of inefficient double marginalization. In the low tax country, the incentives to operate a
multinational structure with fully owned and controlled affiliates lie somewhere in between the two
benchmarks. We may thus conclude that the choice of a transfer pricing rule has a direct impact
on firms’ decisions as to how to serve foreign markets.
When markets are not competitive, the multinationals’ transfer prices are not constrained to be
efficient market prices even under OECD rules. Instead, the ‘appropriate margin’ or the ‘compa-
rable uncontrolled price’ are too high because of double marginalization arising in the comparable
transaction between exporters and independent distributors. This gives rise to production ineffi-
ciencies which affect consumers’ utility. We show that consumers’ utility in the low tax country
is highest in the no-audit case. The reason is that multinationals set lower prices than the local
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independent distributors who contract with exporting firms, and that the incentives to operate a
multinational structure are largest when there is no audit. By constrast, in the high tax country
OECD rules impose a lower marginal cost to foreign firms serving that market, thus translating
into a price advantage for consumers. Thus, consumers’ utility is higher under OECD rules than
under no-audit. Finally, it is worth noting that perfect audit is never the optimal policy for any of
the two countries. Indeed, given the price advantage of multinationals vis-a`-vis exporters, a too
restrictive transfer pricing policy may entice an excessive number of firms to operate as exporters,
thereby harming consumers. This result suggests that consumers’ welfare should be taken into
consideration when evaluating the desirability of a given transfer pricing policy.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Under no audit, a multinational producing in country i finds the
transfer price ri, the imputation of transport cost τii and τij , and the local and export prices pii
and pij that maximize her total profit
Πi = θi
[
(pii − 1)qiiϕi + (ri − τii)
τ
τii
qijϕi
]
+ θj
(
pij − ri
τ
τii
)
ϕiqij
subject to the constraint that she cannot declare permanent losses in any country:
piii + pi
dom
ij = (pii − 1)qiiϕi + (ri − τii)ϕi
τ
τii
qij ≥ 0
piforij =
(
pij − ri
τ
τii
)
ϕiqij ≥ 0.
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A marginal increase in ri increases total profit if and only if dΠi/dri = (θi − θj)(τ/τii)ϕiqij ≥ 0
which holds true if and only if θi ≥ θj . Hence the optimal transfer price is always a corner solution
that makes one of the constraints binding. Assume first that i = 1, so that θi−θj < 0. In this case,
piii + pi
dom
ij = 0, and the transfer price becomes r
∗
1 = τ11 − (p11 − 1)(q11/q12)(τ11/τ). Plugging r
∗
1 in
the total profit yields Π1 = pi
for
12 = θ2 [(p11 − 1)q11 + (p12 − τ)q12]ϕ1, which is independent of the
imputation τ11 and τ12 of transport costs. The optimal prices are thus equal to p
∗
11 = σ/ (σ − 1)
and p∗12 = τσ/ (σ − 1) as given in Section 4.2. Assume next that i = 2, so that θi − θj > 0.
In this case, pifor21 = 0 so that the transfer price is constrained to r
∗
2 = p22τ22/τ . The firm’s total
profit becomes Π2 = pi22 + pi
dom
21 = θ2 [(p22 − 1)q22 + (p21 − τ)q21]ϕ2, which is also independent of
the transport cost imputation. The optimal prices are thus also equal to p∗22 = σ/ (σ − 1) and
p∗21 = τσ/ (σ − 1). 
Proof of Proposition 3. We need to rank the thresholds ϕi and we need to assess their changes
with respect to changes in tax differentials. Let θ ≡ θ1/θ2 < 1. We may then rewrite the
thresholds as follows: ϕo1 = γθ, ϕ
o
2 = γθ
−1, ϕ∗1 = γθ − (1 − θ) (P1/P2)
σ−1 τσ−1, ϕ∗2 = γ, ϕ
c
1 =
γθ (β − θ(β − 1))σ−1 and ϕc2 = γθ
−1 (β − θ−1(β − 1))
σ−1
.
(i) We first show how the threshold ϕi varies with θ. It is readily verified that dϕ
o
1/dθ > 0 and
dϕo2/dθ < 0. Furthermore, dϕ
∗
1/dθ = γ + (P1/P2)
σ−1 τσ−1 > 0 whereas dϕ∗2/dθ = 0. Note also that
dϕc1/dθ = γ [β − θ(β − 1)]
σ−2 [β − θσ(β − 1)], which is positive because β − θ(β − 1) ≥ 1 and
β−θσ(β−1) ≥ β−σ(β−1) = α > 0. Last, dϕc2/dθ = −γθ
−2 [β − θ−1(β − 1)]
σ−2
[β−θ−1σ(β−1)]
is negative for any θ exceeding θ̂ ≡ σ(β − 1)/β.
(ii) We obtain the ranking ϕr1 < γ ≤ ϕ
r
2, for r = o, ∗, c since all the thresholds ϕi are equal to
γ in the absence of tax differentials (θ = 1) and because dϕr1/dθ < 0 ≤ dϕ
r
2/dθ for r = o, ∗, c.
(iii) We further obtain the ranking ϕ∗1 < ϕ
o
1 < ϕ
c
1 because ϕ
∗
1 = ϕ
o
1 −(1− θ) (P1/P2)
σ−1 τσ−1 <
ϕo1 and because ϕ
c
1 = θγ [β − θ(β − 1)]
σ−1 > θγ = ϕo1 since β − θ(β − 1) ≥ 1.
(iv) Finally, we get the ranking ϕ∗2 < ϕ
c
2 < ϕ
o
2 and ϕ
c
2 ≤ ϕ˜
c
2. Indeed, we have ϕ
∗
2 < ϕ
c
2
because dϕ∗2/dθ = 0 > dϕ
c
2/dθ. We furthermore have ϕ
c
2 = ϕ
o
2 [β − θ
−1(β − 1)]
σ−1
< ϕo2 since
β − θ−1(β − 1) < 1 for any θ > θ̂. Also, by definition of ϕ˜c2 = supθ>bθ ϕ
c
2, we have ϕ
c
2 < ϕ˜
c
2. 
Proof of Corollary 2. We compute the limits of the thresholds in Proposition 4 when σ →∞.
First of all, we have γ → γ∞ ≡ (1− α)e
−(1−α) where e = 2.71828 . . . denotes Euler’s number. It is
then immediate to verify that ϕc1∞ = (1− α)θe
−(1−α)θ. Furthermore, ϕc2∞ = (1− α)θ
−1e−(1−α)θ
−1
if θ ≥ θ̂ (or equivalently θ ≥ (1− α)), whereas ϕ˜c2∞ = e
−1 if θ < θ̂ (or equivalently θ < (1− α)).
Next, we have ϕo1∞ = θ(1− α)e
−(1−α), ϕo2∞ = θ
−1(1− α)e−(1−α), ϕ∗1∞ = −∞ and ϕ
∗
2∞ = (1−
α)e−(1−α). Finally, we obtain ϕ∗1∞ = −∞ because limσ→∞ (P1/P2)
σ−1 = (m2 + x2) / (m1 + x1) = 1
is finite, whereas τσ−1 → ∞. At that limit, we then have ϕr1∞ < ϕ
r
2∞, r = o, ∗, c, whereas
ϕ∗1∞ < ϕ
o
1∞ < ϕ
c
1∞ and ϕ
∗
2∞ < ϕ
c
2∞ < ϕ
o
2∞. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let θ ≡ θ1/θ2 < 1. Given a transfer pricing rule r = o, ∗, c, consumers’
utility in country i exceeds that in country j if
P
r
i < P
r
j ⇐⇒
mrj
mri
>
(
pxij/p
r
ij
)σ−1
− 1(
pxji/p
r
ji
)σ−1
− 1
,
which yields condition (32) for the OECD rules. We now provide sufficient conditions under which
(32) is satisfied. First, condition (32) is satisfied for small tax differences. To see this, let
G (θ) ≡ ln
[
1− F
(
γ
1
θ
(
R2
τ
)σ−1)]
− ln
[
1− F
(
γθ
(
R1
τ
)σ−1)]
and
H (θ) ≡ ln
[(
βτ
R1
)σ−1
− 1
]
− ln
[(
βτ
R2
)σ−1
− 1
]
.
Note that G (1) = H(1) = 0 since R1 = R2 in that case. Condition (32) then shows that U
c
1 > U
c
2
if and only if G (θ) > H (θ). Let θ = 1− ε where ε > 0 is small. Using a linear approximation, the
latter inequality becomes G (1)−εG′ (1) > H (1)−εH ′ (1), i.e., G′ (1) < H ′ (1). We readily obtain
G′ (1) = 2γ (β − 1) (σ − 1) [−F ′ (γ)] / [1− F (γ)] and H ′ (1) = 2βσ−1 (σ − 1) (β − 1) / (βσ−1 − 1),
so that
G′(1) < H ′(1) ⇐⇒
−γF ′ (γ)
1− F (γ)
<
βσ−1
βσ−1 − 1
,
which is always true since 0 < F ′(γ) ≤ 1.
We next show that condition (32) is satisfied for the uniform distribution F (x) = x. Indeed,
given that assumption and using the definition of β, we get that U c1 > U
c
2 if and only if
1− (1− α) σ−1
σ−α
1
θ
(
1− 1−α
σ−α
1
θ
)σ−1
1− (1− α) σ−1
σ−α
θ
(
1− 1−α
σ−α
θ
)σ−1 >
(
1− 1−α
σ−α
θ
)1−σ
− 1(
1− 1−α
σ−α
1
θ
)1−σ
− 1
,
where numerators and denominators are positive. Defining the function Z(y) ≡ ln[1−y(σ−1)(1−
y)σ−1]+ ln[(1 − y)1−σ − 1], this condition can be written more simply as Z (y2) > Z (y1) where
y2 ≡ θ
−1 (1− α) / (σ − α) and y1 ≡ θ (1− α) / (σ − α). Because θ > θˆ, we have the conditions
1/σ > y2 > y1 > σ(1− α)
2/(σ− α)2. Therefore the condition Z (y2) > Z (y1) is satisfied if Z(y) is
an increasing function for any 0 < y < 1/σ, which is always true because
Z ′(y) = (σ − 1)
(1− y) [(1− y)−σ − 1] + (1− y)σ−1(1− yσ)
[(1− y)1−σ − y(σ − 1)] [1− (1− y)σ−1] (1− y)
> 0
Indeed, in this expression, the numerator and the denominator are positive because y < 1/σ < 1
and because (1− y)1−σ − y(σ− 1) is a function that is equal to 1 at y = 0 and increases to higher
values for y > 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. We derive conditions under which (33) is satisfied. The proof is similar
to that of Proposition 4. First, condition (33) is satisfied for small tax differences. Indeed, let
G (θ) = ln
[
1− F
(
γ
1
θ
(
R2
τ
)σ−1)]
− ln [1− F (γ)]
and
H (θ) = ln
(
βσ−1 − 1
)
− ln
[
(βτ/R2)
σ−1 − 1
]
Note that G (1) = H(1) = 0. Condition (33) then becomes U c1 > U
∗
1 if and only if G (θ) > H (θ).
Let θ = 1 − ε where ε > 0 is small. Using a linear approximation, the foregoing inequality
becomes G (1) − εG′ (1) > H (1) − εH ′ (1) ⇐⇒ G′ (1) < H ′ (1). We readily obtain G′ (1) =
γ (β − 1) (σ − 1) [−F ′ (γ)] / [1− F (γ)] and H ′ (1) = βσ−1 (σ − 1) (β − 1) / (βσ−1 − 1), so that
U c1 > U
∗
1 ⇐⇒
−γF ′ (γ)
1− F (γ)
<
βσ−1
βσ−1 − 1
which is always true since 0 < F ′(γ) ≤ 1.
Second, condition (33) is satisfied for the uniform distribution F (x) = x. To see this, note
that, using the definition of β and γ, and after straightforward manipulation, condition U c1 > U
∗
1
becomes:
1− 1−α
θ
σ−1
σ−α
(
1− 1−α
σ−α
1
θ
)σ−1
1− (1− α)
(
σ−α
σ−1
)
−σ >
(
σ−α
σ−1
)σ−1
− 1(
1
1− 1−α
σ−α
1
θ
)σ−1
− 1
As in the proof of Proposition 4, we can use the function Z(y) ≡ ln[1 − y(σ − 1)(1 − y)σ−1] +
ln[(1− y)1−σ − 1], so that the last condition can be written more simply as Z (y2) > Z (y0) where
y2 ≡ θ
−1 (1− α) / (σ − α) and y0 ≡ (1− α) / (σ − α). Because θ > θˆ, we still have 1/σ > y2 >
y0 > 0. Therefore the condition Z (y2) > Z (y0) is satisfied if Z(y) is an increasing function for
any 0 < y < 1/σ, which we have proved in the proof of Proposition 4. 
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